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THE ORDINARY, THE EXCEPTIONAL, THE 
CORRUPT, AND THE MORAL: WHAT DID 
THE IMPEACHMENT OF BILL CLINTON 
MEAN FOR AMERICA AND AMERICANS? 
AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE 
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL 
CLINTON. By Richard A. Posner1 




Stephen B. Presser 
Richard Posner is one of my heroes. I mean, the guy has 
written 23 books, he's Chief Judge on the prestigious 7th Circuit 
U.S. Court of Appeals, he was one of the most famous law pro-
fessors at the University of Chicago, and if he didn't invent it, he 
certainly did more to popularize law and economics than any 
man alive. Perhaps it does not go too far to say that most late 
twentieth century legal scholarship is really a dialogue with Pos-
ner, who has taken on virtually every trendy theory in the legal 
academy, and found it wanting.3 He is the foremost exponent of 
practical reason in our time, and, for most practical purposes, 
might be viewed as a latter-day Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.4 He 
is a surprisingly self-effacing man in person, and, if you point out 
all of his glorious accomplishments, and how much you hold him 
in awe, he will explain that you are mistaken, that he is really 
nothing special, as his wife has told him.5 Mrs. Posner not with-
I. Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Sen· 
ior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School. 
2. Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University School of 
Law, and Adjunct Professor of Management and Strategy, Kellogg Graduate School of 
Business, Northwestern University. 
3. See generally Richard Posner, Overcoming Law (Harvard U. Press, 1995), and 
Richard Posner, Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory (Belknap Press of Harvard U. 
Press, 1999). 
4. Even to the point of editing a splendid collection of Holmes's writing: Richard 
Posner, ed., The Essential Holmes (U. of Chicago Press, 1992). 
5. You'll have to trust me on this, but he did say it to me when the two of us ap-
peared on the radio program Extension 720, WGN Radio, September 29, 1999, to discuss 
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standing, I do find Posner extraordinary. Trying to understand 
how one person could produce so much, and so much of it of a 
high caliber, the best I've been able to do is free associate on the 
movies. Perhaps you can remember one of the final scenes in 
Close Encounters of the Third Kind, when the aliens emerge out 
of the giant flying saucer. There is one tall, bald alien in the cen-
ter of them, who is obviously their leader, and who radiates se-
renity, bemusement, and intelligence. Could something similar 
be the origin of Posner? 
In any event, the task at hand is to review the latest from 
the judge's laptop, by way of the Harvard University Press, his 
new book on the impeachment of President Clinton. The 
judge's prior qualities are very much in evidence here. The 
learning is prodigious-Posner's analysis is informed by drawing 
on Clausewitz's On War, (pp. 13, 148, 250) Shakespeare, (pp. 
143, 254) Tolstoy, (p. 264), George Orwell on Salvador Dali, (p. 
214) and the notion of "confirmation bias" from cognitive psy-
chology, (p. 216) just to pick a few suggestive examples. The 
perspective is, as always, Olympian in detachment, and the judge 
has bon, or perhaps I should say mauvais, mots to hurl at virtu-
ally everyone involved in the impeachment imbroglio. The dou-
ble-entendre in the title, An Affair of State, furnishes the judge 
more than a little bit of sport, and it is sometimes difficult to tell 
how seriously we are to take this tome. In the beginning of the 
book is a list of "Dramatis Personae," (p. vii) many of whom are 
barely referred to in the text which follows, and the metaphor of 
drama is seldom pursued, leaving us to wonder whether Judge 
Posner believes he is reviewing a comedy, a tragedy, or perhaps 
a problem play. The judge pauses to explain the meaning of 
such things as "phone sex" (a form of mutual masturbation, he 
informs us, citing to the spicy work, VOX, which the President 
and his nubile paramour, Ms. Lewinsky, shared, (pp. 18, 263)) 
while, some pages later, he excoriates Kenneth Starr for includ-
ing so much salacious detail about a cigar in his famed Report. 
(p.82) 
The Judge seems critical of those who condemn fooling 
around, and Posner is pleased that the "Affair of State" made 
Americans much more realistic and open about sex. He appears 
to applaud the fact that America, if it hasn't yet become France, 
has at least moved closer to the kind of mature attitude Posner 
himself manifested in his Rosenthal Lectures delivered at 
Posner's book. 
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Northwestern University, subsequently published as the book 
Sex and Reason (1992). But there is often a disturbing disso-
nance about the judge's conclusions regarding the impeachment 
proceedings. For example, while he states that "it is clear be-
yond a reasonable doubt, on the basis of the public record as it 
exists today, that President Clinton obstructed justice, in viola-
tion of federal criminal law, by (1) perjuring himself repeatedly 
in his deposition in the Paula Jones case, in his testimony before 
the grand jury, and in his responses to the questions put to him 
by the House Judiciary Committee; (2) tampering with witness 
Lewinsky by encouraging her to file a false affidavit in lieu of 
having to be deposed, and to secrete the gifts that she had re-
ceived from him; and (3) suborning perjury by suggesting to 
Lewinsky that she include in her affidavit a false explanation for 
the reason that she had been transferred from the White House 
to the Pentagon,"6 (p. 54, footnote omitted) and while he con-
cludes that the President's criminal conduct, were he anyone else 
but the President, would have merited a federal sentence of im-
prisonment from 30 to 37 months, (p. 55) the Chief Judge is cu-
riously of two minds about the impeachment itself. 
Thus, in a crucial passage, which is also blurbed on the back 
dust jacket of the book, Posner lays out what he claims to be two 
feasible, and inconsistent, "narratives" of the circumstances that 
led to the "Affair of State," and then reaches an impossible con-
clusion: 
[I]n one, [of the two possible "narratives"] a reckless, lawless 
immoral President commits a series of crimes in order to con-
ceal a tawdry and shameful affair, crimes compounded by a 
campaign of public lying and slanders. A prosecutor could 
easily draw up a thirty-count indictment against the President. 
In the other narrative, the confluence of a stupid law (the in-
dependent counsel law), a marginal lawsuit begotten and 
nursed by political partisanship, a naive and imprudent judi-
cial decision by the Supreme Court in that suit, and the irre-
sistible human impulse to conceal one's sexual improprieties, 
allows a trivial sexual escapade (what Clinton and Lewinskv 
6. And that's not all, apparently. Posner adds that the President, "may also have 
tampered with potential witness Currie, conspired to bribe Lewinsky with a job that 
would secure her favorable testimony, and suborned perjury by Lewinsky by suggesting 
that she include in her Paula Jones affidavit the 'delivering documents' cover story; but 
these offenses cannot be proved with the degree of confidence required for a criminal 
conviction." (p. 54). Nevertheless, according to Posner, "An imaginative prosecutor 
could doubtless add counts of wire fraud, criminal contempt, the making of false state-
ments to the government, and aiding and abetting a crime." (p. 54) 
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called "fooling around" or "messing around") to balloon into 
a grotesque and gratuitous constitutional drama. The prob-
lem is that both narratives are correct. (p. 92, footnote omit-
ted) 
But what if everyone but Posner believes that both narra-
tives are not correct? I for, one, think the first narrative is true, 
while the second is wishful thinking. Here we have what may 
well be a demonstration of Posner's Olympian even-handedness 
and serenity masking a preference for particular values. Perhaps 
one can concede that the Independent Counsel law was "stupid" 
or at least agree with the suddenly conventional wisdom that 
Justice Scalia was right in his sole dissent to Morrison v. Olsen.1 
Even so, I remain unconvinced that Paula Jones' lawsuit was 
"marginal" or that the Supreme Court was "naive and impru-
dent" when it decided the suit could proceed while President 
Clinton remained in office. I am not at all sure that the "human 
impulse to conceal one's sexual improprieties," if one exists, is 
"irresistible," nor, when the married leader of the free world is 
repeatedly "fellated" (to use Judge Posner's marvelous past par-
ticiple (p. 48)) in the Oval Office by a subordinate half his age, 
and eventually on the government payroll, would I describe it as 
a "trivial sexual escapade," "fooling," or "messing" around. 
To take the last point first. Posner assures us that 
"Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky, [was] an affair intrinsi-
cally (that is, as long as it was secret) devoid of any significance 
to anyone except Lewinsky[.]" (p. 13) But, even if the President 
was as stunningly boorish as Posner exquisitely proves that he 
was, wasn't the affair intrinsically significant to him, as well as 
Lewinsky, to say nothing of its significance (even if undiscov-
ered) for the President's relationship to his wife and daughter 
and for the President's own purportedly expressed belief that his 
conversations (up to and including the "phone sex" presumably) 
were monitored by foreign governments, raising the possibility 
of blackmail and international intrigue? Posner is able to draw a 
distinction between public and private conduct and to argue that 
if the majority of Americans weren't troubled by the President's 
peccadilloes, neither should we be. But a number of us testified 
before the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee's 
7. It's been touched by the Greenhouse effect. See Linda Greenhouse, Blank 
Check: Ethics in Government: The Price of Good Intentions, New York Times, Sec. 4, p. 1 
(Feb. 1, 1998) ("After 10 years of mouldering on law library shelves, the Scalia dissent in 
Morrison v. Olson is being cited and passed around in liberal circles like samizdat."). 
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Subcommittee on the Constitution that the Framers, at least, had 
a more holistic conception of integrity and virtue and would not 
have drawn a sharp distinction between private acts and public 
requirements. For them, virtue was paramount in the office of 
President, and a President who twisted the law to serve his own 
ends, as Posner admits this President did, would not have been 
seen as fit to continue in office. George Washington, who took 
the oath seriously, would have wanted Bill Clinton, to whom an 
oath meant nothing, turned out of office.8 
Nor do I find Posner's other assertions-that the Paula 
Jones' suit was "marginal" or that the Supreme Court was wrong 
to allow it to go forward particularly persuasive.9 Posner repeat-
edly describes Ms. Jones's lawsuit as one for "sexual harass-
ment"-and one that was a "long shot" at best. (pp. 7, 13, 28, 91, 
146, 218) It is true that the suit was eventually dismissed by 
Judge Susan Weber Wright (p. 141) (a Bush appointee (p. 141), 
but a Clinton law student, by the way,10 which Posner does not 
tell us), but it seems likely that Judge Wright's dismissal of the 
lawsuit would have been reversed by the Eighth Circuit (as other 
of her decisions regarding the lawsuit were). Judge Wright's 
fining the President almost a hundred thousand dollars for con-
tempt suggests that she at least took the lawsuit seriously, and, it 
should be stressed, the lawsuit is properly seen not as about gar-
den variety "sexual harassment," but rather about abuse of 
power by the President when he was Governor. Posner never 
explores the factual allegations of the Jones lawsuit, nor, it ap-
pears, has he studied the pleadings, because the suit was one for 
a federal claim of abridging federal civil rights under cover of 
law and for a state claim of intentional infliction of mental dis-
tress and defamation.11 Posner is convinced that Ms. Jones suf-
8. The hearings took place on November 9, 1998, before the House Judiciary 
Committee Subcommittee on the Constitution. For the point about George Washington 
see Stephen B. Presser, Would George Washington Have Wanted Bill Clinton Im-
peached?, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 666 (1999). For similar arguments, sec Gary L. 
McDowell, "High Crimes and Misdemeanors": Recovering the Intentions of the Founders, 
67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 626 (1999); John 0. McGinnis, Impeachment: The Structural Un-
derstanding, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 650 (1999); and Jonathan Turley, Congress as Grand 
Jury: The Role of the House of Representatives in the Impeachment of an American Presi-
dent, 67 Gco. Wash. L. Rev. 735 (1999). 
9. I should disclose that I was among the lawyers and academics who signed an 
amicus brief on behalf of Mrs. Jones's position before the Supreme Court. We were right 
then, and we're still right. 
10. See, e.g., Joan I. Duffy, Clinton Hit with $90,686 Contempt Fine in Jones Case, 
The Commercial Appeal (Memphis, TN) AI (July 30, 1999), available at 1999 WL 
22119838. 
II. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 686 (1997) ("Respondent seeks actual damages 
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fered no real harm, (pp. 91, 149) but she claimed that she did, 
she had voluminous evidence which raised the possibility that 
Mr. Clinton's conduct toward her was replicated in his conduct 
toward many other women, 12 and there were reports that the 
reason the President initially refused to settle the Jones case was 
his fear that many of those other women would similarly bring 
suit against him. Can it really be true that Judge Posner believes 
that the conduct of a Governor who (1) exposes himself to a 
state employee, (2) urges her to kiss his revealed member, and 
(3) has a burly state trooper (purportedly familiar with his 
boss's proclivities) guarding the door and implicitly underscoring 
the Governor's direction (implied threat?) to remain silent about 
what happened is inconsequential? 
Could it be that Judge Posner's own feelings about the dan-
ger of our becoming overexcited about sexual matters is driving 
his analysis? Is he really "reasonable" where sex is concerned? 
At one point Posner tells us that " ... seriously believing Chris-
tians (also seriously believing Jews and Muslims) are more likely 
than other people to be outraged by sexual misconduct." (p. 66) 
The implication appears to be that only the extremely religious 
tend to get upset about sex, and the corollary is that realistic 
pragmatists like him do not, but has his anti-prudishness made 
him forget about some of the most important jurisprudential no-
tions, or what our Country is supposed to be all about? 
Judge Posner is admirably clear about where he stands. 
"[N]ormative moral theory, and cognate forms of legal and po-
litical theory, have little to contribute to the public life of the na-
tion," he tells us, in language that the framers would have found 
shocking.13 (p. 12) Referring to a couple of recent titanic na-
tional struggles, Posner explains that "American participation in 
of $75,000 and punitive damages of $100,000. Her complaint contains four counts. The 
first charges that petitioner, acting under color of state law, deprived her of rights pro-
tected by the Constitution, in violation of Rev. Stat.§ 1979,42 U.S.C. § 1983. The second 
charges that petitioner and (former Arkansas state police officer Danny] Ferguson en-
gaged in a conspiracy to violate her federal rights, also actionable under federal law. See 
Rev. Stat.§ 1980,42 U.S.C. § 1985. The third is a state common-law claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, grounded primarily on the incident at the hotel. The 
fourth count, also based on state law, is for defamation, embracing both the comments 
allegedly made to the press by Ferguson and the statements of petitioner's agents.) 
12. Even Judge Posner repeats the "rumor" that the President regularly has sex 
with subordinates. (p. 138) 
13. For the case to the contrary, that is, for the argument that the framers believed, 
and we should as well, that there could be no law without morality, and no morality 
without religion, see Stephen B. Presser, Recapturing the Constitution: Race, Religion, 
and Abortion Reconsidered 42-49 (Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1994). 
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World War II and the Cold War was motivated (primarily any-
way) by national interest rather than by considerations of mo-
rality. Nor is morality central to our politics and attitudes. 
Freedom and wealth are." (p. 155) Somehow I think Washing-
ton, Jefferson, Madison, and even Hamilton would have thought 
that we were about something more. No doubt Posner's single-
minded focus on "freedom and wealth" are part of what gives his 
writing such clarity and power, but his critics have always won-
dered whether life wasn't about more than just free individuals 
pursuing wealth maximization.14 
The American experiment in nationhood was surely con-
cerned with the preservation of freedom, and the protection of 
the rights of property, but these means were supposed to be in 
the service of promoting virtue,15 and advancing morality andre-
ligion, even though, like Posner, most American legal academics 
appear (I am tempted to say, "blissfully") unaware of this simple 
truth. The goal of virtue in our leaders is not one to which Pos-
ner subscribes. (p. 165) "Americans," he tells us, "have reached 
a level of political sophistication at which they can take in stride 
the knowledge that the nation's political and intellectual leaders 
are their peers, and not their paragons. The nation does not de-
pend on the superior virtue of one man." (p. 266) Posner thus 
appears to believe in the gradual evolutionary unfolding of so-
phistication in the American people's exercise of sovereignty, 
but I don't believe we've ever surpassed the "political sophistica-
tion" of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay writing in The Federalist, 16 
and they were convinced that popular sovereignty could only 
flourish in America if the President possessed the kind of virtue 
and integrity that meant that he could be trusted with great 
power. 17 
There is another curious inconsistency in Posner's views 
about what we ought to expect of the President, and to what ex-
tent we have a right to inquire into his private life, or to compel 
him to submit to the Courts in a civil suit. A President, Posner 
seems to suggest, is really just another regular guy, no different 
14. For the most pungent criticism of Posner on this point sec Arthur Allen Leff, 
Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451 (1974). 
15. See Presser, Recapturing the Constitution (cited in note 13), and sources there 
cited. 
16. See, e.g., Hamilton, Madison, & Jay, The Federalist Papers 75-76 (Isaac Kram-
nick ed., 1987), making the point that Ointon Rossiter believed that The Federalist was 
the "one great American contribution to the world's literature on politics," and quoting 
other commentators to the same effect. 
17. See Presser, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (cited in note 8). 
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from the rest of us. Thus, Posner's summation of what can now 
be gainsaid about both the President and his detractors from this 
"Affair of State," is that "We have learned that powerful, intel-
ligent, articulate, well-educated, and successful people who 
would like us to submit to their leadership whether political or 
intellectual are, much of the time, fools, knaves, cowards, and 
blunderers, just like the rest of us." They are "ordinary people, 
with all the ordinary vices .... " (p. 265) In particular, Posner 
writes that after L'Affaire Lewinsky, it is now "difficult to take 
Presidents seriously, as superior people, for the same reason that 
an even greater novel, The Remembrance of Things Past, made it 
impossible by dint of its riveting detail to take aristocrats seri-
ously as superior people." (p. 266) Proust may not be a par-
ticularly good authority for Posner here; Evelyn Waugh for one, 
believed that Proust never really got close to the real aristocrats 
in France, and was actually writing about second-raters. 18 But if 
Posner is right about Presidents, at least, isn't it bizarre for him 
repeatedly to suggest that a pragmatist (of which Posner claims 
to be one) should have been able to work out a way for Clinton 
to be above the law during his incumbency? 
"I don't think it is monarchical," writes Posner "to suggest 
that a President should be entitled to a uniquely generous exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion in his favor- so generous, indeed, 
as to excuse him from being prosecuted for criminal behavior 
committed before or during his term of office that could not rea-
sonably be described as monstrous. Would not the disgrace of 
being labeled a criminal by a censure resolution be punishment 
enough for such a lofty figure? The fall from grace is greater, 
the higher the altitude from which the fall begins." (p. 194) 
Which is it, then, an "ordinary person," who presumably should 
be subject to the law, like everyone else, or "a lofty figure," for 
whom special rules should be applied? More troubling still, 
Posner's "lofty figure" is supposed to be capable of shame, and 
the shame is supposed to be punishment, but, as Posner himself 
understands, Bill Clinton is uniquely incapable of shame. 
Or again, perhaps projecting the Posnerian world-view on 
the American people, the Judge states that Americans are not 
Kantian in their regard for the rule of law, but rather they are 
"prepared to allow that a President may be a little above the law, 
18. I've combed my bookshelves for a citation here, so far without success. I think I 
read it once in a book review by Gore Vidal in the New York Review of Books. Thank 
God we can take a bit of license in book reviews. 
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that felonies can be excused when they seem the harmless con-
sequence of human weaknesses that should never have been a 
subject of legal proceedings, that prosecutorial excess can miti-
gate a defendant's guilt, and that pragmatic considerations 
should bear heavily on the decision whether to force a President 
from office." (p. 230) But what if being "a little above the law" 
is like being a little pregnant? The pragmatic Posner skates a bit 
too close, for my taste, to dispensing with justice and the rule of 
law altogether. To be entirely fair to Posner, he does recognize 
that some chastisement of the President was called for. "[T]he 
American public, he notes, "wants some punishment for 
[Clinton's] actions," it wants, he continues, "a balance between 
the kind of legal rigorism advocated by the Republican critics of 
the President and the alarmingly free-wheeling 'equitable' or 
even populist concept of justice advocated by the most extreme 
of his defenders." (p. 230) Endorsing what he claims the public 
wants, Posner claims that "[w]e might call that balance 'pragma-
tism."' (p. 230) It seems to me, though, that this "balance," pur-
portedly desired by the American people, but clearly preferred 
by Posner, might just as easily be called "Holmesian legal real-
ism," or "total discretion," or even "tyranny." Is it so clear that 
there is an acceptable middle ground here? Perhaps it is only a 
matter of faith or historical tradition, and rigorous argument 
cannot yield scientific or even pragmatic truth, but perhaps 
sometimes extremism in the defense of the rule of law is no vice, 
and moderation in allowing some to be above the law is no vir-
tue. 
In the end, the pragmatic Posner is able to conclude that 
Clinton should not have been made to pay with his job because 
the Supreme Court erred in allowing Paula Jones to pursue what 
he regards as an essentially frivolous claim, a claim spearheaded 
by the President's political enemies. Posner is only able to make 
that argument because of his belief that the President's pecca-
dilloes were private in nature, without a public dimension. (pp. 
148-49) But even Posner himself concedes that he may go too 
far here. Posner observes that the President's private conduct 
(in engaging in perjury, obstruction of justice and the slandering 
of his opponents) was inexcusable, but still one could be a "pri-
vate monster but a public saint." (p. 173) And thus private con-
duct should not be allowed to drive a person the American peo-
ple believe is an effective public official from office. And yet, 
Posner makes the best argument for obliterating this idea: "But 
if I am wrong about this [notion that one can separate public 
158 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 17:149 
from private character], then the inference from private to public 
conduct cannot reasonably be confined to cases in which the pri-
vate conduct is a particularly heinous crime." (p. 173) As he 
suspects, Posner is wrong about this, and thus a President who 
can, with impunity, lie before a judge, a grand jury, and the 
American people about having sexual relations with "that 
woman, Ms. Lewinsky," is uniquely capable of ignoring other le-
gal mandates. 
Posner repeatedly blames the Supreme Court for failure to 
understand that it should not have allowed the Paul Jones law-
suit to proceed, and blames the Independent Counsel Law, (and 
the Court's upholding of that law) for the President's troubles, 
and by implication for the wrenching "Affair of State," through 
which the nation suffered. A Supreme Court bench composed 
of Justice Posners would not have made that mistake and the 
President would not have been put in an excruciating position. 
For after all, "Clinton acted under considerable provocation-
perhaps provocation so considerable that few people in compara-
ble circumstances would not succumb-in stepping over the line 
that separates the concealment of embarrassing private conduct 
from obstruction of legal justice." (p. 174) If the Supreme Court 
had decided the Paula Jones case the other way, Posner assures 
us, "there would have been no occasion for President Clinton to 
obstruct justice while he was President." (p. 218) But this is a 
post hoc propter hoc fallacy of a kind of which I would have 
thought Judge Posner, pragmatist or no pragmatist, incapable. 
The Judge focuses on Paula Jones, and forgets that the Clinton 
administration has managed to generate more scandals per 
square inch than any other Presidency since that of U.S. Grant. 
After all, the Independent Counsel Act may well have been a 
mistake, but it was the Whitewater investigation, Travelgate, the 
Rose Law Firm Billing Records, etc. etc. that put Ken Starr in 
business, not Paula Jones. Lewinsky, who was called as a deposi-
tion witness in the Jones case," only became part of his investiga-
tion when it looked as if Vernon Jordan may have attempted to 
buy Lewinsky's silence (presumably aiding the President) in the 
same manner he may have operated as a go-between for Web-
ster Hubbell.19 Had Paula Jones never existed, instead of be-
lieving that the President would have never obstructed justice, 
19. For the details here see the Starr Report, H.R. Doc. No. 105-310 (Referral from 
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr in Conformity With the Requirements of Title 28, 
United States Code, Section 595(c)). 
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one might just as easily believe the President would have in-
vented another excuse to do it. 
Posner bends over backwards to be even-handed (if I may 
be forgiven an egregious and twisted mixed metaphor), and it 
looks to me like he snaps. Take, for instance, his confident as-
surance that "[o]ne just knows that if the shoe were on the other 
foot-if everything were the same except that the President was 
a Republican-the Republicans would have denounced the in-
vestigation in the same terms that the Democrats used. And 
with perfect sincerity." (p. 91, emphasis Posner's) But one just 
doesn't know that. (Emphasis mine) When Republicans are 
trapped in scandal, they may denounce investigations, but it's 
not in the same terms, they don't fight on shamelessly, and in-
stead, guilt-ridden, they resign, as did Nixon, Gingrich, and 
Livingston. Republicans don't stage defiant pep rallies at the 
White House after their man is impeached; they slink back 
home. There are differences between the parties. The Republi-
cans, particularly the House Managers, though they may have 
been poor tacticians,20 were fighting for a solid cause grounded in 
morality and the rule of law, perhaps even against their long-
term political interest, while the Democrats, knowing they had 
no legal case, outrageously pressed claims they knew to be with-
out merit, and played every devious political card in the deck. 
As Posner puts it, "[The President's lawyer David] Kendall gave 
no impression of believing what he was saying. [His colleague, 
Charles] Ruff, the better actor, gave a convincing impersonation 
of a person who believes what he is saying. The lawyers made 
the Senate Chamber an echo chamber of the President's un-
truths." (p. 246) 
And so, in the end, I still don't buy into Posner's even-
handedness and pragmatism. Perhaps the difference between us 
is that he's a Circuit Judge, above the fray, a happy and lucky 
man, in full command of stunning descriptive powers. I read 
Posner, and I feel a bit like Solieri listening to Mozart. I wish I 
could deliver such lethal blows to my fellow academics as Posner 
effortlessly tosses at Clintonphiles Alan Dershowitz, {p. 216) 
Ronald Dworkin, (p. 238) Bruce Ackerman, (p. 129) or Sean 
20. That's what Posner says, anyway; and, in particular, he thinks the House Man-
agers blew it because they were not politically correct enough. Posner believes that it 
was a mistake for the House Managers to parade before the Senate a large number of 
Christian White Males, and that they would have done better to be more like the White 
House, which fielded a team of lawyers including persons who were physically chal-
lenged, female, Jewish and Black. (p. 253) 
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Wilentz (pp. 235-36). I wish I could have, within a year after the 
event, assimilated thousands of pages of raw data, and produced 
a highly readable account, which has the virtue of giving each 
side its due, clearly staking out a position in the middle (albeit an 
untenable one, I think), and grounding it all in a legal philosophy 
that, if problematic, is at least brilliantly limned, and of which 
Holmes would have been envious. 
I wish I were as Olympian, but then again, maybe I don't. 
Posner is fair enough in his treatment so that the virtue and even 
the nobility of the impeachment effort can still be discerned, 
even if it is not highlighted. And Posner's even-handedness is 
particularly useful when employed to do things like rescuing 
Judge Starr from the obloquy to which the Clintonistas subjected 
him. (p. 69) Still, for Posner, "[a]bout all that can be said is that 
moral rigorist would be inclined to think that the President 
committed impeachable offenses, while a pragmatist would lean, 
though perhaps only slightly, the other way." (p. 187) But more, 
much more can be said. I don't pretend to objectivity here. I 
was called as an impeachment witness before the House Judici-
ary Subcommittee on the Constitution by the Republicans, I 
think they were right,21 and I think Henry Hyde, to whom Posner 
gives rather short shrift,22 was superb to invoke my testimony as 
authority in his speech opening the floor debate on impeach-
ment. Said Hyde, quoting Presser, "Impeachable offenses are 
those which demonstrate a fundamental betrayal of public trust. 
They suggest the federal official has deliberately failed in his 
duty to uphold the Constitution and laws he was sworn to en-
force."23 No hint of Posnerian pragmatism there, just pure Kan-
tian morality and the Rule of Law. It's good enough for Hyde, 
and it's good enough for me. It was right to impeach the Presi-
dent, and he should have been convicted and removed. Fiat jus-
tica, ruat coelum. 
21. In what follows I wallow in the reviewer's prerogative of implying that the 
author should have paid more attention to the reviewers' work. I also fault Posner for 
not giving any consideration to the testimony offered by my fellow witnesses Gary 
McDowell, John McGinnis, and Jonathan Turley, all three of whose efforts suggest Pos-
ner is a bit too quick to characterize the academic testimony offered as shallow. (p. 218) 
See generally the pieces cited in note 8. 
22. See, e.g., p. 208, where Posner accuses Hyde of hypocrisy in defending Oliver 
North's obstruction of justice and attacking Ointon's. Posner gives the impression of 
believing that Hyde is an insufficiently pragmatic Puritan and an unthinking zealot. I 
disagree. I think Hyde showed considerable courage in battling against insurmountable 
political odds, particularly in the Senate, where the deck was clearly stacked against him. 
23. Henry Hyde. speech before the full House, December 18, 1998. 
